In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN

New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the dangling parent reference.

l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown, due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking:

[Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_chan_close l2cap_sock_teardown_cb pchan->state = BT_CLOSED l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------> l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_new_connection l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) <-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) l2cap_sock_kill(parent) /* bt_sk(sk)->parent dangling */

Fix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes where missing, to avoid data races.

Although the data races on pchan->state should be fixed too, this defensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case.