In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/cmd: don't leave...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/cmd: don't leave list poison in ->hash_node

io_uring_cmd_del_cancelable() uses hlist_del() to take a command off ->cancelable_uring_cmd, which leaves LIST_POISON1/2 behind in ->hash_node. Requests are recycled through the request cache without being reinitialised, and not every user of ->hash_node sets it up before it is used:

If a vectored futex wait is woken while futex_wait_multiple_setup() is still queueing the futexes, io_futexv_wait() doesn't add the request to ->futex_list, and leaves the completion to the task_work queued by the wake up. io_futexv_complete() ends in __io_futex_complete(), whose hlist_del_init() is fine for a request that is unhashed, which is how all other users of the node leave it. If the request was a cancelable uring_cmd in its previous life, e.g. a ublk FETCH_REQ, it writes through LIST_POISON2:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-...] RIP: 0010:io_futexv_complete+0x219/0x420 Call Trace: tctx_task_work_run+0x804/0x950 tctx_task_work+0x71/0xa0 task_work_run+0x118/0x200

Leave the node unhashed.