In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/cancel: drop sqd->lock while SQPOLL waits
An exiting SQPOLL thread calls io_uring_cancel_generic() with sqd->lock
held, and keeps it across cond_resched() and the sleep until nothing is
in flight anymore. A zero-copy send notification can't be canceled and
stays pending as long as the peer doesn't read, so the lock is held for
as long as a user cares to. io_ring_exit_work() needs it to park the
thread, and so do IORING_REGISTER_IOWQ_AFF and IOWQ_MAX_WORKERS. With
64 such rings sharing the thread, every iou_exit slot sleeps on the lock
and no ring gets freed for anyone.
Drop the lock around cond_resched() and the sleep, like the main loop of
the thread does. Each walk of ctx_list is still under one hold, and
nothing is kept across the unlock. The thread drops its io-wq, frees its
tctx and clears sqd->thread under one hold after the loop, so whoever
holds the lock and finds sqd->thread set can still use them.
[axboe: adapted to the schedule_timeout() based loop]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it