In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/server: prevent file publication after tree disconnect
TREE_DISCONNECT closes the tree's published file handles before marking and
removing the tree connection. A concurrent CREATE that already holds a tree
reference can therefore publish its file after the close pass. When CREATE
drops its reference, the tree can be freed while the published file still
points to it.
Mark and remove the tree connection before closing its files, and serialize
both new-open and durable-reconnect volatile ID publication with that state
transition. An opener is then either published in time for the close pass
or rejected after disconnect with STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED.
Keep a tree reference while a file carries its tree pointer. This protects
asynchronous users that can defer the file's final destruction past tree
disconnect.
The close pass can race the successful FP_NEW to FP_INITED transition.
Take the opening request's file reference atomically with that transition.
This keeps the file alive until request completion even if teardown removes
the ID immediately.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126)
Read of size 4 at addr ff11000101540f80 by task poc/153
Call Trace:
proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126)
seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:231)
proc_reg_read_iter (fs/proc/inode.c:299)
vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:574)
ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Allocated by:
ksmbd_tree_conn_connect (fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c:35)
smb2_tree_connect (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:2819)
handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:368)
Freed by:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6801)
handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:332)
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it