In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()
Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"),
I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:
Call trace:
panic+0x58/0x5c
die+0x160/0x178
bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4
call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0
do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74
el1_brk64+0x34/0x54
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc
el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P)
sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c
sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc
This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:
+++ snip +++
thread A thread B
ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO)
sync_file_ioctl()
sync_file_get_name()
dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name()
ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops)
if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())
ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e.
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED)
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL)
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops)
!= &drm_crtc_fence_ops)
+++ snap +++
In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal,
which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON()
triggers.
Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and
because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an
unacceptable way to handle a failure.
Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same
problem and is fixed by this patch as well.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it