In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reinstate IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU flag in ieee80211_tx_prep_agg()
The commit 592234e941f1 ("wifi: mac80211: Fix iTXQ AMPDU fragmentation
handling") changed the way handling of the IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU flag
is done in mac80211, so the only place it is set is in
ieee80211_tx_dequeue().
This means that any frames that are sent to the driver via drv_tx() will
no longer have the flag set. In particular, this affects packets going
through ieee80211_tx_pending(). Evan reported that this can result in
the ath9k driver failing to account such packets in its block ack
window, eventually overrunning the window and stalling TX.
Fix this by reinstating the flag in ieee80211_tx_prep_agg() when inside
a valid block ack window. This should be harmless for the TXQ path, and
will reinstate the previous behaviour for drivers that use the flag as a
signal to track the packet in the window.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it