CVE-2026-99650

HIGHPre-NVD 7.87.8
EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

This high-severity CVE scores 7.8 under a secondary CVSS source (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit probability: 0.2% (4th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs). No GitHub Security Advisory CVSS is on record for this CVE.

Triggered by: Headline CVSS from a secondary CVSS source
Sources: EPSS, a secondary CVSS source

Also known asEUVD-2026-130943 (ENISA EUVD) · GHSA-jrv6-2gpm-h6x6 (GitHub Security Advisories)Source: ENISA EUVD

7.8EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS: 7.8Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

A fix is available — apply it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in

A folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the swap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma can then be freed, so ksm_might_need_to_copy() must not dereference it to compare roots.

Doing so can result in some false-positives, resulting in the reverse mapping missing the new folio mapping, preventing migration and reclaim.

SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allows individual anon_vma objects to be reused immediately after freeing. A stale pointer can then refer to another anon_vma whose root matches, even though the target VMA is not linked to that anon_vma.

Move the anonymous rmap compatibility checks into folio_anon_rmap_compatible(). Keep the page-index check and compare the folio's anon_vma pointer against the VMA's own anon_vma and root first.

If neither matches, bite the bullet and walk the VMA's anon_vma_chain. The VMA keeps these anon_vmas alive, and finding a match guarantees that reverse mapping can find the new mapping.

Lorenzo Stoakes says in a private discussion:

"This isn't quite equivalent to the existing check.

Every anon_vma in an anon_vma_chain shares the same root, but if you split a VMA then fork both of them like this:

VMA A / \ VMA B VMA C \ / root <- anon_vma 1 ----^ ^---- / parent \ anon_vma 2 anon_vma 3 | | VMA D VMA E

VMA's D and E both get their own new anon_vma's such that:

VMA D: anon_vma 2 -> anon_vma 1 -> root VMA E: anon_vma 3 -> anon_vma 1 -> root

And if you found a folio referencing anon_vma 2, the existing check:

anon_vma->root == vma->anon-vma->root

Would be true for VMA's B, C, D & E.

However after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain.

Whether or not that could actually happen in practice... 🙂 I don't know.

[...] after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. [...] I would [...] say that you are making the test stricter but more correct. "

If this affects performance when KSM was never even involved, we could just track whether KSM ever merged anything and just skip these checks.

There isn't really a lot we can do otherwise: for mapped folios we might be able to use folio_get_anon_vma(), but for unmapped folios there really is no easy way to see if the anon_vma is still valid.

Document the (confusing) lifetime requirements of folio_anon_vma().

CVSS v3
7.8
EG Score
7.8HIGHmedium confidence
EG Risk
35
EG Risk 35/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity78% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.8 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.2% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's BOD 26-04 default: no one has published Automatable for this CVE, and CISA treats it as “no” for a CVE not in KEV.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
EPSS PROB
0.2%
EPSS %ILE
4th
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
EG Likelihood
0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).

A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.

Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

November 20, 2026

Last Modified

November 22, 2026

Advisory Details (2)

Auto-updated Nov 22, 2026
Patch available.
Web page

mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a
Web page

mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-99650(2)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 10× in last 7d / 10× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed its CVE.org record (CNA or CISA ADP). An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). "EchelonGraph re-scored" is our own recompute of this CVE's score, not an update from a source, and is not counted in the refreshes above. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-11-22 11:28 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  2. 2026-11-22 11:28 UTCVendor advisory
  3. 2026-11-22 11:28 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-jrv6-2gpm-h6x6
  4. 2026-11-22 11:16 UTCEchelonGraph re-scoredFirst assessed: 7.8 HIGH
  5. 2026-11-22 11:16 UTCVendor advisory
  6. 2026-11-22 11:16 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-jrv6-2gpm-h6x6
  7. 2026-11-22 11:15 UTCMITRE cvelistV5CVSS v3 → 7.8 · severity → HIGH
  8. 2026-11-21 16:42 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 4th percentile
  9. 2026-11-20 16:39 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 4th percentile
  10. 2026-11-20 08:11 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-jrv6-2gpm-h6x6
  11. 2026-11-20 07:04 UTCENISA EUVD ID recordedEUVD-2026-130943 · Source: ENISA EUVD
  12. 2026-11-20 05:58 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  13. 2026-11-20 05:57 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked

Frequently asked(5)

What is CVE-2026-99650?
CVE-2026-99650 is a high-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on November 20, 2026. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in A folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the swap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma can then be freed, so…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-99650 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-99650 was published on November 20, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of November 22, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-99650 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-99650 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.2% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (4th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-99650?
CVE-2026-99650 has a CVSS base score of 7.8 (a secondary CVSS source that NVD displays; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-99650?
A fix for CVE-2026-99650 is available: update to the fixed version the vendor names in its advisory. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-99650 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

Dependency Blast Radius

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