In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix whiteout creation in casefolded directories
unlink and rmdir fail with EINVAL on an overlay with casefolded
(case-insensitive) layers, if the name exists in a lower layer.
Casefolded layers need CONFIG_UNICODE. Root can mount such an overlay,
and so can an unprivileged user in a user namespace, with tmpfs layers.
Overlayfs does not change a lower layer. To remove a name that exists
there, it hides the name with a marker file, a whiteout. It creates the
whiteout in the work directory, a scratch directory on the upper
filesystem, and renames it over the name in the upper directory:
- ovl_whiteout() creates the whiteout with mknod, or as a hard link to
an earlier whiteout.
- ovl_cleanup_and_whiteout() then prepares the rename with
start_renaming_two_dentries(), which returns -EINVAL if the source or
the target dentry is unhashed, that is, not in the dentry hash table.
With casefolded directories, both dentries can be unhashed:
- The target. Lookup in a casefolded directory leaves a negative dentry
unhashed, so the rename target is unhashed if the name does not exist
in the upper directory.
- The source, which is the new whiteout. tmpfs hashes a dentry when
mknod or link makes it positive, but ext4 does not, so on ext4 the
source is unhashed as well.
The cleanup after the failure also refuses an unhashed dentry, so on
ext4 the whiteout is left behind in the work directory.
Reproduced with rm and rmdir on casefolded tmpfs and ext4 layers, also
as uid 1000 in a user namespace.
Fix this by creating the whiteout with ovl_create_temp(), which repeats
the lookup if the new dentry is unhashed. Prepare the rename with
start_renaming_dentry(), which looks up the target name with the
directories locked. The caller looked the name up without a lock, so
return -ESTALE if the name now refers to a different inode.
[amir: pass the name used for lookup instead of taking a name snapshot]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it