In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Clear throttle state when leaving the fair class
Task-based CFS bandwidth throttling removes a task's fair sched_entity
while the scheduler core still considers the task queued. p->throttled
carries the fair-specific state across dequeue/enqueue operations.
DEQUEUE_CLASS removes the task from cfs_rq->throttled_limbo_list
but retains the bit. If the last finite CFS quota is disabled while
the task runs in another class, it is absent from the unthrottle walk and
the bit survives.
Returning to fair while cfs_bandwidth_used() is false then performs a real
fair enqueue with p->throttled still set.
After bandwidth is re-enabled, a class-change dequeue treats the
stale bit as limbo state and skips __dequeue_task(). p->se.on_rq therefore
remains set, and put_prev_task_fair() places the entity in the EEVDF tree
while the task moves to RT. On exit, the fair picker can select the
TASK_DEAD task. __schedule() then returns to do_task_dead(),
which hits BUG().
Keep p->throttled across migrations and group moves, but clear it on
DEQUEUE_CLASS because fair-specific state must not outlive fair-class
membership. A later return to fair uses the normal enqueue path. That path
still respects a throttled cfs_rq.
A KASAN, LOCKDEP and DEBUG_LIST v7.3 kernel reproduced the do_task_dead()
BUG in 3/3 root and 3/3 delegated uid-1000 runs with CapPrm=CapEff=0 and
RLIMIT_RTPRIO=1. The fix passed both matrices plus a 3/3 class-switch
control with bandwidth continuously enabled, without a scheduler warning,
KASAN report, lockdep splat or crash.
An AI coding assistant analyzed the state mismatch and drafted the initial
reproducer, fix candidate and this changelog. The source paths, trigger,
controls and results were rechecked against the cited revisions.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it