In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: only update flags for TT events
In the first implementation of the translation table events, it was only
possible to announce:
* ADD: new locally detected client
* DEL: disappeared local client
If an ADD event was queued and then a DEL event was queued in the same
timeslot, it is valid to destroy both events because nothing actually
changed for remode nodes
But with commit 3c4f7ab60cc2 ("batman-adv: improve the TT component to
support runtime flag changes") and subsequent changes, it could also happen
that there are extra ADD events:
* ADD: _NEW_ locally detected client
* ADD: already existing client with new flags
* DEL: disappeared local client
The first and the last type of event could in theory still be removed
together from the (to be announced) events queue. But if the "update flags"
ADD is dropped together with the DEL, it would still leave global
translation table of a remote node in the incorrect state - believing that
the client didn't disappear.
If a detected client was previously announced, a DEL event must only
overwrite the "update flags" ADD but the DEL itself must still continue to
exist in the (to be anounced) events queue. For now, adjustment of the
announced flags is used for everything instead of dropping already queued
up events completely.
Similarly, a DEL followed by an ADD caused both entries to be deleted. But
the new ADD could announce flags changes which were not yet present for the
client before it was marked for DELetion. The new ADD must therefore only
overwrite the DEL - but still be kept.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it