In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Handle ARM erratum for CONT under invalidation with SVA
The erratum (MMU-700: #3777127, S3: #3673557) deals with under
invalidation of a CONT PTE grouping in the SMMU. The recommended work
around is to use a range invalidation that spans the entire CONT. The only
user of CONT in the kernel right now is through SVA sharing a CPU page
table that contains a CONT created by the mm.
Previously it was thought that this errata was dealt with because the
driver always uses range invalidation. However, there is a subtle detail
in the errata that the invalidation range must fully enclose the entire
CONT for it to work.
It seems that two sequential range invalidations, with a split point
falling inside a CONT grouping, will not prevent the errata.
The SMMU's range invalidation generation algorithm does not produce a
single invalidation for a single SVA invalidation request, nor does the mm
carefully align the SVA invalidation ranges to accommodate the splitting
of the invalidation into several ranges.
Thus, when processing a SVA invalidation, the range invalidation splitting
routine can generate a range invalidation that is split in the middle of
the CONT and risk under invalidation from this errata. This condition
could be triggered by a malicious userspace manipulating the TLB gathers
via mmap/mprotect/munmap.
Update the errata list to the include the S3 variation, detect the IOMMUs
that have it, and then have SVA invalidations use a simplified version of
the over invalidation algorithm from the tlbi rework series. This ensures
that a single range invalidation is issued for a single MMU notifier
callback and now the range invalidation is guarenteed to cover any posible
CONT.
Future work to add CONT to iommu_domain page tables should either use this
one-invalidate/one-range invalidation algorithm or disable CONT support in
the iommu_domain.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.2): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.2 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.2 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.the CNA's CVSS · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it