CVE-2026-99563

HIGHPre-NVD 7.57.5
EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

This high-severity CVE scores 7.5 under the CNA's CVSS (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit probability: 0.2% (4th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs). No GitHub Security Advisory CVSS is on record for this CVE.

Triggered by: Headline CVSS from the CNA's CVSS
Sources: the CNA's CVSS, EPSS

Also known asEUVD-2026-130287 (ENISA EUVD) · GHSA-5mc6-r26h-mrgj (GitHub Security Advisories)Source: ENISA EUVD

7.5EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationNo fix is confirmed yet: check the vendor's advisory for a fixed release; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS: 7.5Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.

The CVE record's CNA (kernel.org) lists Linux versions before 7.1 and 7.4-rc1 and later as unaffected. No release containing a fix is confirmed on record.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener

A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted (negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...) stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections smbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with -EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections.

Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was started, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it with smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener's rdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy() does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against the backlog until they are released.

sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket: smbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the listener.

In order to make that work:

  • a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via
kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently.
  • smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending
list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero return it schedules nsc's teardown with smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc's id_priv->handler_mutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cm_id must not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us, so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure orphan nsc.
  • smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to
the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released.
  • smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables
purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets.

CVSS v3
7.5
EG Score
7.5HIGHmedium confidence
EG Risk
34
EG Risk 34/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity75% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.5 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.2% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's BOD 26-04 default: no one has published Automatable for this CVE, and CISA treats it as “no” for a CVE not in KEV.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: No fix is confirmed yet. Check the vendor's advisory for a fixed release; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
EPSS PROB
0.2%
EPSS %ILE
4th
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (7.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
7.5 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.the CNA's CVSS · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
EG Likelihood
0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).

No fix is confirmed yet. Check the vendor's advisory for a fixed release; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.

Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.

The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

November 19, 2026

Last Modified

November 22, 2026

Advisory Details (3)

Auto-updated Nov 22, 2026
No fix on record yet.
Web page

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f
Web page

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb
Web page

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-99563(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 7× in last 7d / 7× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed its CVE.org record (CNA or CISA ADP). An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). "EchelonGraph re-scored" is our own recompute of this CVE's score, not an update from a source, and is not counted in the refreshes above. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-11-22 11:17 UTCEchelonGraph re-scoredFirst assessed: 7.5 HIGH
  2. 2026-11-22 11:17 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-5mc6-r26h-mrgj
  3. 2026-11-22 11:15 UTCMITRE cvelistV5CVSS v3 → 7.5 · severity → HIGH
  4. 2026-11-21 16:42 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 4th percentile
  5. 2026-11-20 16:39 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 4th percentile
  6. 2026-11-19 16:03 UTCENISA EUVD ID recordedEUVD-2026-130287 · Source: ENISA EUVD
  7. 2026-11-19 15:50 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-5mc6-r26h-mrgj
  8. 2026-11-19 14:48 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  9. 2026-11-19 14:48 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked

Frequently asked(5)

What is CVE-2026-99563?
CVE-2026-99563 is a high-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on November 19, 2026. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-99563 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-99563 was published on November 19, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of November 22, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-99563 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-99563 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.2% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (4th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-99563?
CVE-2026-99563 has a CVSS base score of 7.5 (a secondary CVSS source that NVD displays; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-99563?
No fix for CVE-2026-99563 is confirmed yet. Until one is published, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation — for example, keep it off the internet or limit it to trusted networks — and watch the vendor's advisory for the fix. The CVE record's CNA (kernel.org) lists Linux versions before 7.1 and 7.4-rc1 and later as unaffected. No release containing a fix is confirmed on record. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-99563 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

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