In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: serialize directory emptiness checks with readdir
SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY holds fp->readdir_lock while it calls iterate_dir()
on fp->filp. An SMB2 SET_INFO request with FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION
can resolve the same FileId and call ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir() on the same
filp without that lock.
iterate_dir()'s inode read lock permits concurrent readers and does not
serialize per-file iterator state. ext4 stores its dx readdir cursor and
fname RB tree in file->private_data. Concurrent reset or refill can
therefore free a fname node while the other worker still traverses it or
retains its RB-tree link, resulting in use-after-free accesses.
An authenticated SMB client with list and delete rights on a directory in
a writable KSMBD share backed by ext4 can trigger this when the directory
takes the dx readdir path. The client overlaps an SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY
request with an SMB2 SET_INFO request carrying FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION
on one live FileId.
In one x86_64 SMP KASAN multi-shot guest using ksmbd-for-next at
171df27077fb, the unmodified kernel reported a cross-worker use-after-free
before a panic. The first report's access and free stacks show the two
request paths directly (trimmed):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550
Read of size 8 by task kworker/2:0/29
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
Call Trace:
ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550
htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x535/0x990
ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x319/0xba0
ext4_readdir+0x175a/0x2f40
iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630
smb2_query_dir+0x1003/0x1cc0
Freed by task 279:
free_rb_tree_fname+0x67/0xc0
ext4_readdir+0x13a9/0x2f40
iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630
ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir+0xa2/0x100
smb2_set_info+0x2ffa/0x45d0
Take fp->readdir_lock across the entire emptiness check. This places both
iterators over that handle's filp in the same lock domain while
preserving the disposition status handling. The exact code change
completed a warning-free x86_64 KASAN bzImage build. Tracing three request
pairs showed that the two iterate_dir() calls no longer overlapped and the
expected statuses were preserved. A further 1,600 reproducer iterations
completed with expected statuses and no KASAN report, Oops, or panic.
The reproducer and complete guest configuration are available privately
to maintainers on request.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it