In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix early procfs exposure race
Currently, init_cifs() calls cifs_proc_init() near the beginning of
the function, before INIT_LIST_HEAD, leading to a momentarily
uninitialized, but exposed, procfs. If a userspace process reads this
empty procfs, iterating over a zeroed list_head leads to a NULL
pointer dereference and a kernel oops/panic.
For example, if a delay is added between cifs_proc_init() and
INIT_LIST_HEAD, and a userspace process is polling
/proc/fs/cifs/DebugData, the following oops occurs:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000608
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3477 Comm: cat Not tainted
7.3.0-02212-g4df4d2a577db-dirty #6 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0x103/0xd80 [cifs]
Call Trace:
? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400
? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400
seq_read_iter+0x183/0x400
proc_reg_read_iter+0x62/0x90
copy_splice_read+0x215/0x310
splice_file_to_pipe+0xec/0x1c0
do_splice+0x4b8/0x780
__se_sys_splice+0x18f/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x109/0x330
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fix this by moving cifs_proc_init() down in init_cifs(), ensuring it runs
only after all internal lists, locks, counters, and workqueues are fully
ready, but before registering the filesystem. Update the error cleanup
ladder and exit_cifs() to maintain proper LIFO order.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it