In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Fix use-after-free of a local reenq node left on an inactive cpu
A local DSQ reenq is queued on the rq through a per-sched node and run from
deferred work. When the reenq is requested from dispatch, the work is a
balance callback queued once dispatch is done. A cpu going down installs
balance push early in its teardown, and queue_balance_callback() refuses new
callbacks from then on. ops.dispatch() keeps running on that cpu until the
rq goes offline after an RCU grace period, so a reenq it requests in that
window may never run. The IMMED handling in dispatch_one() requests one the
same way.
A reenq requested from elsewhere for a cpu that is already offline goes
through irq_work_queue_on(), which warns, and its work doesn't run until the
cpu comes back.
Either way the node stays on the rq's list. When the scheduler is freed,
scx_sched_free_rcu_work() warns and frees the pcpu with the node still
linked, and the list is walked again once the cpu comes back.
An inactive cpu's local DSQ holds only tasks that are bound to it or are
being moved off, so the reenq is pointless. Ignore reenqs of an inactive
cpu's local DSQ.
The test is lockless. The hotplug thread of a cpu going down runs on that
cpu, and it marks the cpu inactive before it installs balance push. A
dispatch on the cpu runs to completion before that thread can run there, so
a dispatch that saw the cpu active has queued its callback by then. Requests
from outside dispatch run from the wakeup path or through irq_work, which
balance push doesn't affect. The grace period after the cpu goes inactive
waits for any requester that saw it active, so that irq_work is queued while
the cpu is online.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it