In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-fc: fix use-after-free in nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection()
nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection() looks up the association with
nvmet_fc_find_target_assoc(), which returns it with a reference held,
and drops that reference as soon as the target queue has been allocated.
iod->assoc is then dereferenced again by nvmet_fc_makeconnid() while
building the connection id.
The queue only borrows the pointer and takes no reference of its own.
Once the lookup reference is dropped the association is kept alive
solely by the reference taken when it was created, so a disconnect LS or
a remote port unregister running concurrently can free it before
nvmet_fc_makeconnid() reads it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888179f1b000 by task kworker/u9:2/1167
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021)
process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Freed by task 1167 on cpu 0 at 405.998150s:
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:57 mm/kasan/common.c:78)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285)
kfree (include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2705 mm/slub.c:6405 mm/slub.c:6720)
nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1808 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021)
process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888179f1b000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 2048-byte region [ffff888179f1b000, ffff888179f1b800)
Hold the lookup reference until the response has been built, and drop it
on the error path as well.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.1 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it