In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the
handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message
type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related
to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware
deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device
driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially
length fields at message replies.
Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in
zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and
zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and
potential kernel memory disclosure.
Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more
carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t
for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add
defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies,
validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length
from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.
Additionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions
which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions
and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely
with removing a misplaced BUG_ON().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it