CVE-2026-99491
UNRATEDCVSS · not yet scored▲ElevatedⓘEG-KEV Tier 3: ElevatedEG-KEV is EchelonGraph's own tiering of exploitation signals from CISA KEV, CISA's SSVC data (Vulnrichment), ransomware data, public exploit-code references and EPSS.Tier 3 is not evidence of exploitation. It means public exploit code is referenced, or CISA's SSVC data says "public PoC", or EPSS ranks the CVE in the top 5%.Signals for this CVE: other public exploit code (a GitHub or vendor proof of concept, or an Exploit-DB entry not marked verified).First public exploit code on record: 2026-11-20 (GitHub PoC woshigenm/CVE-2026-99491)EchelonGraph confidence 38%: a heuristic from the tier and the number of signals, not a measured probability.
Also known asEUVD-2026-130166 (ENISA EUVD) · GHSA-2mq8-33hp-8j6v (GitHub Security Advisories)Source: ENISA EUVD
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_intuos_pad
wacom_intuos_pad() accesses wacom->shared->touch_input locklessly
inside the interrupt handler context. If the Touch sibling device
is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() clears 'touch_input'
outside any lock, creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU)
race condition where a preempted reader in interrupt context
dereferences the freed pointer, leading to a Use-After-Free.
Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for the touch_input
pointer:
- Annotate 'touch_input' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu
- Wrap all lockless readers in wacom_wac.c with guard(rcu)() and
rcu_dereference() using a unified wacom_report_touch_mute()
helper
- Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer()
- Call synchronize_rcu() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to ensure
all active RCU readers have finished before the input device is
freed
Also wrap wacom_set_shared_values() and touch/pen assignments in
wacom_add_shared_data() inside the wacom_udev_list_lock to serialize
concurrent probe assignments, and verify that 'shared->touch == hdev'
before setting touch_input to prevent concurrent sibling probe state
desynchronization.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it