In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle
The Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of
the same physical device using a shared structure 'wacom_shared'
inside 'wacom_hdev_data'. The driver kept a volatile representative
pointer 'data->dev' pointing to a sibling 'hid_device' for physical
path comparisons during sibling matching.
This pointer management is fragile. When the representative device
is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update
'data->dev', leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when
subsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling 'data->dev'
pointer.
Resolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle:
- Eliminate the volatile 'data->dev' representative pointer
completely
- Redesign 'wacom_hdev_data' to store stable static copies of the
required attributes upon first allocation: 'phys' path string,
'vendor', 'product' IDs and the sibling's 'device_type'
- Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in
wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data()
This ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if
individual siblings are dynamically added or removed.
To secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races:
- Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in
wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list
traversal and lookup
- Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is
already held
Also, do not accumulate the 'device_type' capability flag during
subsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling's
device_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior
without introducing side effects.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it