In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add SRCU protection for virtual-mode HPT hcalls
The virtual-mode HPT hcall handlers (H_ENTER, H_REMOVE, H_BULK_REMOVE,
H_CLEAR_REF, H_CLEAR_MOD) call into book3s_hv_rm_mmu.c, which accesses
memslots via kvm_memslots_raw(). kvm_memslots_raw() uses
rcu_dereference_raw_check() to bypass SRCU lockdep annotation checking.
This is safe in real mode because the entire guest entry/exit is wrapped
in srcu_read_lock/unlock inside kvmppc_run_core() and
kvmhv_run_single_vcpu().
However, since commit 6165d5dd99db ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: add virtual
mode handlers for HPT hcalls and page faults"), these same handlers are
also executed in virtual mode via kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(), which runs
after SRCU has already been released on guest exit.
A concurrent KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION deletion or move can therefore
call synchronize_srcu_expedited() — which does not wait for this thread —
and then kfree(slot) and vfree(slot->arch.rmap) while the hcall handler
still holds a raw pointer to the memslot. lock_rmap() then writes to
freed vmalloc memory, leading to use-after-free and memory corruption.
Because kvm_memslots_raw() suppresses lockdep checks, this race is
entirely silent.
Fix this by factoring out the 7 HPT hcall handlers (H_REMOVE, H_ENTER,
H_READ, H_CLEAR_MOD, H_CLEAR_REF, H_PROTECT, H_BULK_REMOVE) into a
helper function, kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall(), and wrapping its call
site in srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu) / srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx).
Targeting only the HPT hcalls avoids wrapping non-HPT hcalls that sleep
(such as H_CONFER, H_REGISTER_VPA, H_PAGE_INIT) or handlers that already
acquire SRCU internally (such as H_RTAS).
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it