In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: imx-jpeg: cancel timeout worker when streaming stops
Each per-fd context ctx owns a delayed_work (ctx->task_timer, callback
mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout) armed via schedule_delayed_work() at the end
of mxc_jpeg_device_run() to recover a stalled encode/decode job. The only
existing cancellation is cancel_delayed_work() in the frame-done IRQ
handler, which de-queues a pending work item but does not wait for a
callback that has already started, and it only runs when a frame completes.
When the fd is closed while a job is in flight (the frame-done IRQ has not
fired yet), nothing syncs the worker before mxc_jpeg_release() frees ctx
with kfree() after v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(). A queued or executing
mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout() can then recover ctx through
container_of(&ctx->task_timer) and dereference it (ctx->mxc_jpeg,
slot_data, dev_warn) after ctx has been freed.
Cancel the worker from mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming(). The cancel cannot live
in mxc_jpeg_release(): mxc_jpeg_device_run() arms the timer while holding
only hw_lock, not the mxc_jpeg->lock mutex that release holds, so a cancel
in release could still race a concurrent mxc_jpeg_device_run() that
re-arms the timer afterwards. mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() instead runs inside
v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() -> vb2_queue_release(), i.e. after
v4l2_m2m_cancel_job() has set TRANS_ABORT and waited for any in-flight job
to finish (so __v4l2_m2m_try_queue() will not queue and v4l2_m2m_try_run()
will not run any further job for this context, which prevents
mxc_jpeg_device_run() from re-arming the timer) and before the m2m context
is freed. cancel_delayed_work_sync() removes a pending work item and waits
for a running callback, so the worker can no longer race with the
subsequent kfree(). The cancel is placed before the buffer-release loop so
a concurrently running timeout callback cannot race with it over the same
buffers. If the frame-done IRQ canceled a still-pending timer, this cancel
is a no-op; if the timeout callback has already started, it waits for the
callback to finish. The same mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() call is also
reached from VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, which drains the worker early, although
STREAMOFF itself does not free ctx -- the use-after-free arises only
when the fd is later closed.
This bug was found by static analysis.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.0): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.0 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.0 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it