In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: hold MP_JOIN msk ref when cloning reqsk
TCP request migration clones pending request sockets with
inet_reqsk_clone(). For MPTCP MP_JOIN requests this byte-copies
subflow_req->msk, but the clone does not own a reference.
The original and cloned requests can consequently drop the same msk
reference, leaving one request with a dangling pointer. This manifests as
a KASAN slab-use-after-free in subflow_req_destructor():
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in subflow_req_destructor (net/mptcp/subflow.c:45)
Write of size 4 at addr ff1100010e008d40 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-00353-gc27e36054537 #10 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
subflow_req_destructor (net/mptcp/subflow.c:45)
subflow_v4_req_destructor (net/mptcp/subflow.c:694)
__reqsk_free (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:906)
reqsk_timer_handler (include/net/request_sock.h:137 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1147)
Allocated by task 10014:
sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2246)
sk_clone (net/core/sock.c:2488)
mptcp_sk_clone_init (include/net/sock.h:1848 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3564)
subflow_syn_recv_sock (net/mptcp/subflow.c:883)
tcp_check_req (net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:934)
Freed by task 0:
slab_free_after_rcu_debug (include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2677 mm/slub.c:6439)
rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897)
Last potentially related work creation:
kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2638 mm/slub.c:6377 mm/slub.c:6504)
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2289 net/core/sock.c:2391)
sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2419)
__sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2430)
sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2441)
mptcp_close (include/net/sock.h:2020 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3399)
inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:442)
The buggy address belongs to the cache MPTCP of size 2968
The buggy address is 128 bytes inside a freed 2968-byte region
A non-NULL subflow_req->msk means that the request owns one reference. The
third ACK can concurrently transfer the original request reference to the
child and release it, so taking an unconditional hold on the copied pointer
is unsafe.
MPTCP sockets use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and all current inet_reqsk_clone()
callers run in an RCU read-side critical section. Document and
lockdep-check that calling-context requirement. Read the pointer from the
original request and acquire a reference only if it is still live. Use
refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() so the subsequent ownership validation
cannot be reordered before the try-get, then re-read the original request
to verify that it still owns the same msk. If either check fails, clear the
clone pointer; otherwise its normal destructor balances the new reference.
Mark the ownership-transfer store with WRITE_ONCE() to match the lockless
reads.
The following patch completes the clone fixup for MP_CAPABLE token
ownership. Both patches carry the same Fixes tag and are required for
stable backports.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.1 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it