In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: dc395x: sync the waiting_timer before freeing the host
The waiting_timer callback re-arms itself and takes the host lock.
adapter_uninit() currently stops it with timer_delete(), which does not
wait for a callback already running on another CPU. The final
scsi_host_put() that frees the host (and the host lock the callback
dereferences) runs right after adapter_uninit(), so a concurrent or just
re-armed callback can fire after the free, leaving a potential
use-after-free window.
Replace timer_delete() with timer_shutdown_sync() at the top of
adapter_uninit(), before the host-lock section: the timer is dequeued,
a running callback is waited for and rearming is blocked before the chip
is halted, so it cannot fire at all once the adapter has ceased to
function. Waiting outside the lock avoids the self-deadlock that would
result from syncing a callback blocked on the lock we still hold.
No shutdown is needed for selto_timer because it has no reachable armer
or callback.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it