In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ufs: use u64 for directory size in ufs_last_byte
ufs1_read_inode() and ufs2_read_inode() copy the untrusted 64-bit
on-disk size into inode->i_size. ufs_last_byte() then truncates that
value to an unsigned int before calculating the valid extent of a
directory folio.
A directory size of exactly 4 GiB is truncated to zero. In
ufs_find_entry(), subtracting the requested record length from that zero
forms an endpoint almost 4 GiB beyond the mapped folio. A crafted UFS2
image produces:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ufs_find_entry+0x583/0x6e0 [ufs]
Read of size 1
...
ufs_find_entry
ufs_inode_by_name
ufs_lookup
__lookup_slow
path_lookupat
The KASAN classification reflects that the adjacent physical page was
free; the source-level operation is an out-of-folio read. A controlled
UFS1 test with CONFIG_UFS_FS_WRITE enabled also made ufs_find_entry()
return a directory entry from an adjacent anonymous page. unlink() then
passed that pointer to ufs_delete_entry(), which cleared the adjacent
page's 3
2-bit d_ino. This write result reproduced three out of three
times.
UFS normally requires a privileged mount path. A relevant boundary is
a privileged automounter or image-processing service handling an
attacker-supplied filesystem. The write primitive additionally requires
UFS1 to be mounted read-write with CONFIG_UFS_FS_WRITE enabled; the read
is reachable with read-only UFS2.
Keep the intermediate size arithmetic at 64 bits so non-final pages are
bounded at PAGE_SIZE. With this change, the same controlled tests reach
the real on-disk directory entry and produce no adjacent-page write or
KASAN report. A reproducer and full validation logs are available on
request.
The vulnerable helper is present in v7.2-rc3, v7.1, v6.18.38, v6.12.95,
v6.6.111, and upstream master at 1229e2e57a5c. Runtime reproduction and
fix validation were performed in an x86-64 QEMU guest running v7.2-rc3
with generic KASAN.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it