In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pps: generators: don't use the driver's info after unregister
A file that was opened before pps_gen_unregister_source() keeps
pps_gen, and with it the pointer to the driver's pps_gen_source_info.
PPS_GEN_SETENABLE and PPS_GEN_USESYSTEMCLOCK keep using that pointer
after the driver has gone:
- pps_gen_tio allocates its info with devm_kzalloc(), so after an
unbind both ioctls read freed memory, and SETENABLE calls the
driver's enable() with its freed private data.
- pps_gen-dummy does not set info->owner, so it can be unloaded while
the file is open, and the ioctls then read the unloaded module's
data and call its code.
TIO can't probe in a VM, as it needs ART. A test driver that registers
its info in devm memory like TIO does, unbound while /dev/pps-gen0 is
open, gives:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x4c1/0x580
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e647f38 by task ppsgen64/145
...
Freed by task 146:
kfree+0x25a/0x6d0
release_nodes+0xd1/0x140
devres_release_all+0x10e/0x1a0
device_unbind_cleanup+0x71/0x250
device_release_driver_internal+0x41b/0x570
unbind_store+0xd9/0x100
and unloading pps_gen-dummy while its file is open oopses:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0203040
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x372/0x580
Protect info in the ioctl handler with a mutex, and clear it under the
mutex on unregister, so that unregister waits for the ioctls using it
and later ones fail with -ENODEV. PPS_KC_BIND does the same for a
removed PPS device since commit 3649f9a6b897 ("pps: don't allow
PPS_KC_BIND on removed devices"). The sysfs attributes need nothing
new: they are removed, and their callbacks drained, before info is
cleared.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it