In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply
nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does
not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which
nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c
("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved
nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out:
label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on
skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer
identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every
sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache()
runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the
same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock
while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR
encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each
other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves
cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every
earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info.
From a 6.12.91 production server:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd
RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd]
RDX: 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd]
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd]
nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd]
svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc]
svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc]
svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc]
nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned
store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the
shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a
replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the
replay still holds in cstate->slot.
Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a
request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request
that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound
response before each request, so the flag starts clear.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it