In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot
nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached
reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate
ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and
nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A
COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the
SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows.
nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running
nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves
op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having
succeeded.
nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that
returned an error. That test reads the status the operation
reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and
takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the
zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so
the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24
__asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60
read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810
nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240
Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following
operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing
the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply
cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of
an error returned from SEQUENCE.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it