In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock
Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it
returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if
a wait was interrupted by a signal. This would allow a parallel sendmsg()
to race.
Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held,
and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether
it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the
lock if it's still held.
Fix this by:
(1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and
get rid of the indicator parameter. This makes it easier to see where
the lock is held.
(2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted,
just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock
(3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving
->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer.
Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space
failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call
user_mutex. The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any
error at a second attempt.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it