In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: udlfb: don't rebuild the mode list while the framebuffer is in use
dlfb_setup_modes() frees info->modelist with fb_destroy_modelist() and
rebuilds it, but fbcon holds raw pointers into that list in
fb_display[i].mode and nothing un-publishes them the way
do_unregister_framebuffer() and store_modes() do with
fbcon_delete_modelist(). The function does refuse to install a new mode
while the framebuffer has users (dlfb->fb_count != 0), but only after the
list is already destroyed. Reached from the 0666 "edid" sysfs attribute,
an unprivileged write to /sys/class/graphics/fb0/edid therefore fails with
-EINVAL and still leaves every fb_display[i].mode dangling; the next
console switch reads the freed fb_videomode in fb_videomode_to_var().
Test fb_count before touching the list. fbcon takes a reference through
fbcon_open(), so that condition covers exactly the states in which
fb_display[] points into the list, and the errno returned to userspace is
unchanged.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fb_videomode_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:905)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880107b449c by task kworker/1:1/47
Workqueue: events console_callback
Call Trace:
fb_videomode_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:905)
display_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:998)
fbcon_switch (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2182)
redraw_screen (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:994)
complete_change_console (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:1141)
console_callback (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3358)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
...
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
freed 96-byte region [ffff8880107b4480, ffff8880107b44e0)
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-18). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it