CVE-2026-99212

HIGHPre-NVD 7.07.0
EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

This high-severity CVE scores 7.0 under a secondary CVSS source (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit probability: 0.1% (1st percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs). No GitHub Security Advisory CVSS is on record for this CVE.

Triggered by: Headline CVSS from a secondary CVSS source
Sources: EPSS, a secondary CVSS source
Trending — 7 sources updated this week

Also known asEUVD-2026-111964 (ENISA EUVD) · GHSA-5gwv-gqxh-9p46 (GitHub Security Advisories)Source: ENISA EUVD

7.0EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.1%CVSS: 7.0Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

A fix is available — apply it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure

rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED. A synchronous failure there - -ENOMEM from the route work allocation, an SA query that cannot be set up, a RoCE route with no usable device - makes addr_handler() destroy the id the event was delivered on. That id is ic->i_cm_id, and nothing clears the pointer: the connection sits in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING with a freed id until its shutdown calls rdma_disconnect() and rdma_destroy_id() on it.

The ROUTE_RESOLVED case already avoids this: rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect() forces a zero return while ic->i_cm_id == cm_id, as the comment there explains. Do the same here - drop the connection and return 0 - so the id stays RDS's to destroy from the shutdown, and the reconnect gets a fresh one.

CVSS v3
7.0
EG Score
7.0HIGHmedium confidence
EG Risk
32
EG Risk 32/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity70% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.0 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.2% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's BOD 26-04 default: no one has published Automatable for this CVE, and CISA treats it as “no” for a CVE not in KEV.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
EPSS PROB
0.1%
EPSS %ILE
1st
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (7.0): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.0 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
7.0 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
EG Likelihood
0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).

A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.

Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

October 28, 2026

Last Modified

October 31, 2026

Advisory Details (7)

Auto-updated Oct 31, 2026
Patch available.
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98d446b7c013254a8a7b49720557676a3a851fde
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91ece3efa064f0b3b3c67b9b045d9eeb4a034e43
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7c7d0ff876377fea7ae876a28d6df8d9349df57
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92143c5d80382588d5a3047a4f14023ee9ef6485
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e677eda15df7d5ce256654343418043c7ffd6f9b
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8f141f65885810e24fc23b8a71692db62d535bf
Web page

net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/664fd3205cbec71ac52c005ee705cd917bb6fb1a

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-99212(2)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 23× in last 7d / 23× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). Most recent first.

  1. 2026-11-02 16:46 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  2. 2026-11-01 16:36 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  3. 2026-10-31 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 5th percentile
  4. 2026-10-31 13:27 UTCEG score recompute
  5. 2026-10-31 13:27 UTCVendor advisory
  6. 2026-10-31 13:27 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-5gwv-gqxh-9p46
  7. 2026-10-31 12:53 UTCEG score recomputeFirst assessed: 7.0 HIGH
  8. 2026-10-31 12:53 UTCVendor advisory
  9. 2026-10-31 12:53 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-5gwv-gqxh-9p46
  10. 2026-10-31 12:53 UTCMITRE cvelistV5CVSS v3 → 7 · severity → HIGH
  11. 2026-10-30 16:35 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 5th percentile
  12. 2026-10-30 13:42 UTCVendor advisory
  13. 2026-10-30 13:42 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-5gwv-gqxh-9p46
  14. 2026-10-30 13:27 UTCNVD update
  15. 2026-10-30 12:51 UTCEG score recompute
  16. 2026-10-30 12:51 UTCVendor advisory
  17. 2026-10-30 12:51 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-5gwv-gqxh-9p46
  18. 2026-10-30 12:50 UTCMITRE cvelistV5
  19. 2026-10-29 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 5th percentile
  20. 2026-10-28 11:26 UTCNVD update
  21. 2026-10-28 11:01 UTCENISA EUVD ID recordedEUVD-2026-111964 · Source: ENISA EUVD
  22. 2026-10-28 10:44 UTCEG score recompute
  23. 2026-10-28 10:44 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked

Frequently asked(5)

What is CVE-2026-99212?
CVE-2026-99212 is a high-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on October 28, 2026. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED. A synchronous…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-99212 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-99212 was published on October 28, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of October 31, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-99212 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-99212 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.1% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (1st percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-99212?
CVE-2026-99212 has a CVSS base score of 7.0 (a secondary CVSS source that NVD displays; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-99212?
A fix for CVE-2026-99212 is available: update to the fixed version the vendor names in its advisory. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-99212 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

Dependency Blast Radius

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