In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response
__iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one
place and checks only that the index resolved:
case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN:
task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt);
if (!task)
return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;
iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at
nothing else, so a target can name any slot in the pool, including one
that has never been used. task->conn is then NULL, and both
iscsi_nop_out_rsp() and iscsi_complete_task() dereference it. One
unsolicited NOP-In is enough; a Text Response carrying the same ITT
crashes in iscsi_complete_task() instead.
Require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command, the way
iscsi_itt_to_ctask() does for the command opcodes.
[ 6.298634] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 6.298642] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
[ 6.298652] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 111 Comm: iscsistart Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 6.298654] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 6.298656] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160
[ 6.298691] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00
[ 6.298698] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907be8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 6.298701] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888006116800 RCX: 0000000000000020
[ 6.298702] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88800525d578 RDI: 0000000000000060
[ 6.298703] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 6.298706] R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 6.298706] R13: 000000000000002e R14: ffff8880056eb440 R15: ffff888006116800
[ 6.298707] FS: 00007fc02d1c2740(0000) GS:ffff8880b29bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 6.298710] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6.298711] CR2: 000055fe3b56ddf8 CR3: 00000000053b9004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 6.298712] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6.298713] Call Trace:
[ 6.298714]
[ 6.298714] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x13a8/0x22a0
[ 6.298758] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0
[ 6.298759] iscsi_tcp_hdr_recv_done+0x870/0x2c80
[ 6.298778] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0
[ 6.298800] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390
[ 6.298804] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810
[ 6.298812] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510
[ 6.298814] tcp_rcv_established+0x1f56/0x3a00
[ 6.298842] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960
[ 6.298847] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.5 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.5% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-06). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it