EchelonGraph verdictMonitorLow exploitation likelihood right now — keep watching.
- •No CVSS published and no exploitation signals yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS v2: —Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.
The CVE record's CNA (kernel.org) lists Linux versions 6.1.120 up to but not including 6.1.191, 6.6.55 up to but not including 6.6.160, 6.10.14 up to but not including 6.11 and 6.11.3 up to but not including 6.12 as affected, and Linux versions before 6.12 and 7.3 and later as unaffected. No release containing a fix is confirmed on record.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix status of pending commands flushed on power off
cmd_complete_rsp() receives a struct cmd_lookup and, for a pending
command that has no cmd_complete callback, falls through to
cmd_status_rsp(cmd, data). cmd_status_rsp() reads data as a u8 *, so
the status sent comes from the first byte of match->sk's
representation, not from match->mgmt_status.
commit f53e1c9c726d ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible crash on
mgmt_index_removed") changed the callers' data from &status to &match
and updated the cmd_complete branch to match->mgmt_status, but left
the fall-through passing data unchanged.
In mgmt_index_removed() match->sk is NULL, so every such command is
answered with status 0x00 (Success) instead of
MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX. In __mgmt_power_off() it is NULL too,
unless a Set Powered command was pending: then settings_rsp() has
stored that command's socket in match->sk, and the byte sent comes
from the socket pointer. Either way the status the caller set,
MGMT_STATUS_NOT_POWERED (or MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX when the device
is being unregistered), is lost.
Pass the status the callers set.
This was seen on a QCA9377 laptop: bluetoothd's Start Discovery,
pending when the adapter was powered off, was answered with Command
Status 0x00 and no parameters, and bluetoothd 5.72 crashed on the
zero-length success. BlueZ master has since added the length check
on that path ("adapter: Fix crash on short start discovery reply",
BlueZ a734b06059cb), but userspace should still be told Not Powered,
not Success.
Tested on Ubuntu 7.0.0-31 with a virtual controller (hci_vhci):
power off is held in HCI Write Scan Enable while a Start Discovery is
submitted, and the flush answers it with status 0x00 before this
change and 0x0f (Not Powered) after.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it