In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix missing alloc tagging of direct mempool allocations
Commit 1d78d56c43ef ("netfs: Fix folio_queue ENOMEM in writeback by
adding a mempool") added a mempool for the folio_queues and made the
request, subrequest and folio_queue allocations distinguish between
writeback and everything else. Writeback is part of memory reclaim
and must not fail due to ENOMEM, so it allocates under GFP_NOFS
through mempool_alloc(), which may dip into the pool's reserve and,
if that runs empty, wait for elements to be returned. The
GFP_KERNEL paths, which can return -ENOMEM to their callers, invoke
the pool's ->alloc() callback directly instead.
The direct call, however, skips the alloc_hooks() wrapper that the
mempool_alloc() macro provides. The pool callbacks, mempool_alloc_slab()
and mempool_kmalloc(), call kmem_cache_alloc_noprof() and kmalloc_noprof()
and rely on current->alloc_tag having been set by the caller. With
CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=y this leads to
current->alloc_tag not set
WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:161 at __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook
alloc_tag was not set
WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:166 at __alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook
at allocation and free time respectively, as reported when reading
files on a CIFS mount. The allocations are also missing from
/proc/allocinfo.
Wrap the direct ->alloc() invocations in alloc_hooks() with a new
mempool_alloc_noreserve() helper in include/linux/mempool.h, next to
the other alloc_hooks()-wrapped macros such as mempool_alloc(). The
GFP_KERNEL paths keep their failable allocation semantics, they just
get tagged now.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it