In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: set up the TX info early to fix failure paths
The previous commit 2c51457d930f ("wifi: mac80211: free ack status
frame on TX header build failure") cleaned up the leak, but still
left the code a bit messy and the failed SKB didn't get reported
to userspace.
Fix this up by initialising skb->cb[] earlier, which allows using
ieee80211_free_txskb() and therefore reports it for the failure
in ieee80211_build_hdr(), and unifies the ieee80211_skb_resize()
failure path with it.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it