In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: fix off-by-one bounds check in RX submit
btintel_pcie_submit_rx() used frbd_index > rxq->count to guard the
FRBD array access, allowing frbd_index == rxq->count to pass through
and index one element past the end of the array. Change the check to
>= rxq->count so every out-of-range index is rejected.
This issue was reported by Claude Mythos.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it