In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the ".stacktrace" modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace. create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record. event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and copies that many longs into a 31 entry array:
n_entries = *stack; memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));
Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event holds at the offset, so any field will do:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork # echo 'hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace' > trigger # (true)
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130 timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0 enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0 RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30 event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690
The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over. No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.
Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already states the rule, "must be a long[] type", so enforce it once the name has been resolved. Names which resolve to no field at all, "hitcount.stacktrace" and the common_* pseudo-fields, are refused for the same reason: they hold no stacktrace to read.