EchelonGraph verdictMonitorNo release containing the referenced fix is confirmed: check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.1%CVSS: 3.3Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
A fix is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but no release containing it is confirmed — find the release that contains it; until it is applied, mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation).
The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5_tcp_connect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy->sa_family) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: set_context_proxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsock_connect_ctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AF_INET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct net_sockaddr_in as a struct net_sockaddr_in6 and copied the 16-byte sin6_addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy.
With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, z_vrfy_zsock_connect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct net_sockaddr_storage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AF_INET6 stream socket, point setsockopt(SO_SOCKS5) at a proxy it controls, and call connect() with a short AF_INET destination to have the kernel send it 12 bytes of supervisor stack residue per attempt. Without CONFIG_USERSPACE the read runs past the end of the caller's own struct net_sockaddr_in, disclosing adjacent memory to the proxy; the family mismatch can arise unintentionally when a destination is obtained from DNS while an IPv6 proxy is configured.
Impact is limited to information disclosure of at most 12 bytes per connect() call, with no write primitive; the leak is delivered to whoever operates the SOCKS5 proxy. The mirrored pairing (IPv6 destination through an IPv4 proxy) is memory-safe but encoded the destination as SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 from the first four bytes of the IPv6 address, causing the proxy to connect to an unrelated host. Exploitation requires the non-default CONFIG_SOCKS option, a socket with SO_SOCKS5 configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 support in the image.
The fix moves the encoding into a helper that selects the address type from dest->sa_family and validates dest_len against the matching struct net_sockaddr_in/struct net_sockaddr_in6 before copying, rejecting under-length or unsupported destinations with an error.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (3.3): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 3.3 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 3.3 LOWCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.the CNA's CVSS · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it