Issue summary: Receiving crafted out-of-sequence DTLS handshake fragments may
cause OpenSSL to allocate a full message-length reassembly buffer for each
buffered message, so a small amount of wire data consumes a large amount of
memory.
Impact summary: A remote attacker can send a few small crafted DTLS handshake
fragments to make a DTLS server or client allocate well over a megabyte of
memory per connection, which may lead to memory exhaustion and Denial of
Service if many connections are made.
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: DTLS handshake messages can arrive out of order and fragmented,
so OpenSSL buffers fragments of up to ten out-of-sequence messages until
reassembly is possible. When the first fragment of a new message arrives,
OpenSSL allocates a buffer sized to the full message length declared in the
fragment header, plus a reassembly bitmap, instead of storing only the bytes
actually received. The declared length is capped by the maximum certificate
list size, 128KB by default, and that cap applies to every handshake message
type rather than only to Certificate messages.
Only DTLS endpoints reach this code. TLS, QUIC and applications that do not
use DTLS are unaffected. An attacker sends fragments that declare a large
message length but carry almost no data, using up to ten distinct message
sequence numbers.
A single connection can then hold roughly 1.4MB of buffers from about 156
bytes on the wire. Because the number of buffered messages is capped, memory
exhaustion requires many connections or many peers, which is why the severity
is Low.
FIPS impact: no
The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.3): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.3 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it