CVE-2026-93241

UNRATEDCVSS · not yet scoredTrending — 3 sources updated this week
—
EchelonGraph verdictMonitorLow exploitation likelihood right now — keep watching.
  • No CVSS published and no exploitation signals yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS v2: —Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memcg: bypass the reclaim and oom killer for dying tasks once oom_reaper is done

At Meta, we are seeing instances where an OOM killed job is stuck in the exit path for several hours. In one particular case, the job was stuck for more than 8 hours and I had to manually remove the memory.max limits to allow the process to exit.

The job was a single process job and had ~55 GiB memory.max and zswap enabled. It had almost 0 anon in memory and ~111 GiB in zswap compressed to ~51 GiB zswap pool (i.e. almost all of memory.current was zswap). Nothing was left on the LRUs to reclaim.

On further inspection, I observed ~20k threads of that process stuck with the following stack:

[<0>] mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x4e/0xa0 [<0>] charge_memcg+0x8bf/0x990 [<0>] mem_cgroup_swapin_charge_folio+0x4e/0x80 [<0>] __read_swap_cache_async+0x10c/0x260 [<0>] swapin_readahead+0x116/0x3f0 [<0>] do_swap_page+0x13c/0x1ce0 [<0>] handle_mm_fault+0x61d/0x11f0 [<0>] do_user_addr_fault+0x3e7/0x6d0 [<0>] exc_page_fault+0x8f/0x110 [<0>] asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [<0>] __get_user_8+0x14/0x20 [<0>] futex_cleanup+0x27/0x1c0 [<0>] futex_exit_release+0x47/0x60 [<0>] do_exit+0x107/0x940 [<0>] do_group_exit+0x81/0xa0 [<0>] get_signal+0x2b1/0x6e0 [<0>] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x1a/0x1c0 [<0>] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa8/0x1c0 [<0>] do_syscall_64+0x152/0x250 [<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

In addition the dmesg was filled with "Out of memory and no killable processes..." messages.

I have no idea why oom reaper was not able to reap/unmap the process. My guess is that since oom reaper tries to acquire mmap_lock in read mode limited number of times and then gives up, there might be a thread of that process which had mmap_lock in write mode at that time.

My initial suspicion was the futex_cleanup and kernel page fault causing infinite fault and charge retries but that was put to rest in previous discussions happened on similar problem [1].

My current theory is that it is just a simple slow serialization behind the oom_lock. Unlike page allocator, memcg charge code takes the oom_lock without the "try". Though memcg oom code uses mutex_lock_killable(), note that in the call stack get_signal() consumes SIGKILL (or sigdelset(SIGKILL)) before calling do_group_exit(). So this mutex_lock_killable() is just a mutex_lock() here. Therefore 10s of thousands of threads are waiting on oom_lock and one by one they get -EFAULT from get_user() in the futex cleanup code and bails out.

Discussion from [1] led to commit a75ffa26122b ("memcg, oom: do not bypass oom killer for dying tasks") which routes dying tasks into the OOM path precisely so the oom_reaper can reap their mm and free the memory asynchronously. But the reaper is best-effort and one-shot: if it cannot take mmap_lock for read (e.g. a sibling thread holds it for write) it sets MMF_OOM_SKIP and never retries, leaving only the glacial oom_lock-serialized synchronous drain.

Once MMF_OOM_SKIP is set there is no more asynchronous reclaim coming for the mm, so a dying task charging against it has nothing left to wait for: it frees its memory only once it finishes exiting. Running reclaim and the (no-victim) OOM killer for it is then pointless, and doing it for 10s of thousands of exiting threads is what serializes them behind oom_lock. So before reclaim, if current is an OOM victim whose reaper is done, fail the charge.

Reproduced with 20k threads, each parking a robust futex head on its own zswapped page, OOM-group-killed while a sibling holds mmap_lock for write so the reaper gives up and sets MMF_OOM_SKIP. Tested on next-20260728 and baseline show ~90 seconds exit time while with the patch the exit time reduced to ~3 seconds.

CVSS v3
—
EchelonGraph score
Not yet assessedNo source has published severity data for this CVE yet — no CVSS score from NVD or a CNA, no GitHub advisory, and it is not in CISA KEV. This is not a rating of zero; we cannot assess it yet.
EG Score
—
EG Risk
—
EPSS PROB
0.2%
EPSS %ILE
12th
KEV
Not listed

Published

September 24, 2026

Last Modified

September 25, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-93241(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Affected Packages

(1 across 1 ecosystem)
Debian:14(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
linux6.12.100-1 ... 7.2~rc7-1~exp1 (176 versions)
  • every version up to 7.2.6-1: fixed in 7.2.6-1
—

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 8× in last 7d / 19× in last 30d)

Each row is a source pipeline that fetched or updated this CVE on that date, with what changed. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-10-04 23:22 UTCEPSS rescore
  2. 2026-10-03 17:31 UTCGHSA enrichment
  3. 2026-10-01 19:51 UTCEPSS rescore
  4. 2026-10-01 00:16 UTCEG score recompute
  5. 2026-10-01 00:16 UTCGHSA enrichment
  6. 2026-09-30 15:04 UTCEPSS rescore
  7. 2026-09-28 13:52 UTCEPSS rescore
  8. 2026-09-28 13:52 UTCEPSS rescore
  9. 2026-09-28 06:38 UTCEG score recompute
  10. 2026-09-28 06:38 UTCGHSA enrichment
  11. 2026-09-27 13:49 UTCEPSS rescore
  12. 2026-09-26 15:59 UTCEPSS rescore
  13. 2026-09-25 13:24 UTCGHSA enrichment
  14. 2026-09-25 13:18 UTCNVD update
  15. 2026-09-25 12:57 UTCGHSA enrichment
  16. 2026-09-25 12:54 UTCMITRE cvelistV5
  17. 2026-09-24 16:30 UTCNVD update
  18. 2026-09-24 15:47 UTCEG score recompute
  19. 2026-09-24 15:46 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-93241?
CVE-2026-93241 is a publicly disclosed vulnerability published on September 24, 2026. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: bypass the reclaim and oom killer for dying tasks once oom_reaper is done At Meta, we are seeing instances where an OOM killed job is stuck in the exit path for several hours. In one particular case, the job was stuck for…
When was CVE-2026-93241 disclosed?
CVE-2026-93241 was first published on September 24, 2026, with the most recent update on September 25, 2026. EchelonGraph re-ingests CVE updates from NVD on a 2-hour cycle, so this page reflects the latest published state.
Is CVE-2026-93241 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-93241 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.2% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (12th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-93241?
No fix for CVE-2026-93241 is confirmed yet. Until one is published, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation — for example, keep it off the internet or limit it to trusted networks — and watch the vendor's advisory for the fix. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-93241 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

Dependency Blast Radius

See which npm, PyPI, Go, and Maven packages are affected by CVE-2026-93241

Explore →

Is Your Infrastructure Affected by CVE-2026-93241?

EchelonGraph automatically scans your cloud infrastructure and maps CVE exposure using blast radius analysis.