The LdapAuth and LinOTPAuth authentication plugins in MISP contain an authentication bypass vulnerability. Both LdapAuthenticate and LinOTPAuthenticate replace CakePHP's FormAuthenticate class but fail to replicate its _checkFields() input validation guard. As a result, the email and password fields extracted from the login request are passed to downstream authentication logic without verifying that they are non-empty strings.
In the LDAP authenticator, an empty or null password is forwarded to ldap_bind(). Per RFC 4513 section 5.1.2, a bind request with a valid DN and an empty password constitutes an unauthenticated bind, which many LDAP directory servers accept as successful. An attacker who knows any valid user email address in the directory can therefore authenticate as that user without possessing a password. Additionally, non-string values (null, false, arrays) are either coerced to empty strings by ldap_bind(), raise TypeErrors, or are misinterpreted as find conditions in _findUser(), all of which can lead to unintended authentication outcomes.
In the LinOTP authenticator, the same missing guard allows non-string credentials to be concatenated into the LinOTP verification request, and in the mixed-authentication branch an empty password is accepted against a stored hash of the empty string.
A secondary issue in the LDAP authenticator is that newly created user accounts (auto-provisioned on first LDAP login) were assigned an empty password. Because the save path skips validation, the empty string is hashed and stored. If the user later ceases to be found in LDAP and the mixed-authentication fallback is used, the stored hash of the empty string verifies against an empty password, again permitting unauthenticated access.
The vulnerability requires that the affected plugin (LdapAuth or LinOTPAuth) is enabled on the MISP instance and that the attacker knows at least one valid email address registered in the directory or MISP user store. No prior authentication is required. Successful exploitation grants the attacker the full privileges of the impersonated user, which may include administrative access to threat intelligence data.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.3): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.3 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.3 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-05). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it