In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: validate banner payload length
When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the payload_len field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
payload_len of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
populate_in_iter():
------------[ cut here ]------------ !iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter) WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810 net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 ... Call Trace: ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is
expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (server_feat and
server_req_feat). Therefore, payload_len must be at least 16 bytes.
Fix this by adding a check in process_banner_prefix() to reject a
payload_len smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and
correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error.