In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Reject oversized Read segments at decode time
The RPC/RDMA Read list decoder stores wire-supplied segment
lengths without validation. xdr_count_read_segments() checks
4-byte alignment for non-zero position values but does not
cap the segment length.
An oversized rs_length reaches svc_rdma_build_read_segment(),
which derives nr_bvec from it and can drive a large dynamic
bvec allocation before verifying that enough rq_pages remain.
If the post-allocation page-overrun guard fires, the freshly
acquired rw context is not returned, leaking the resource.
Reject any segment whose length exceeds the receive context's
page budget during Read list decoding, consistent with how
xdr_check_write_chunk() bounds Write segment counts against
rc_maxpages. Also return the rw context on the existing
post-allocation overrun path in svc_rdma_build_read_segment(),
keeping that defensive guard balanced.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it