In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: qcom_battmgr: fix use-after-free
qcom_battmgr_pdr_notify() queues enable_work when the PMIC GLINK service
comes up, and the worker recovers battmgr through container_of() to issue
firmware requests. The PMIC GLINK client stays on the client list until
its devres release action runs, so a PDR notification can keep queueing
the work, and a pending or running worker can access battmgr after devres
frees it.
Make enable_work device-managed with devm_work_autocancel(), registered
before the PMIC GLINK client is allocated. The devres cleanup then
releases the client first, so no further notification can queue the work,
and cancels the work before battmgr is freed.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it