EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS: 7.8Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.
The CVE record's CNA (kernel.org) lists Linux versions before 7.2 and 7.3-rc1 and later as unaffected. No release containing a fix is confirmed on record.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: panasonic-laptop: Fix sentinel write past pcc->sinf[]
acpi_pcc_retrieve_biosdata() rejects SINF packages only when
pcc->num_sifr is strictly less than hkey->package.count, then
unconditionally writes a trailing sentinel at
pcc->sinf[hkey->package.count]. But pcc->sinf[] is allocated with
exactly pcc->num_sifr elements (valid indices 0..num_sifr-1), so that
write needs num_sifr strictly greater than package.count to stay in
bounds -- num_sifr == package.count passes the existing check but
still overflows by one element.
This is exactly the case probe()'s existing num_sifr++ workaround
("Some DSDT-s have an off-by-one bug where the SINF package count is
one higher than the SQTY reported value") is written to accommodate:
when a DSDT's SINF package count equals SQTY+1, the workaround makes
num_sifr equal to package.count, which is precisely the boundary that
overflows here. Found via UBSan (array-index-out-of-bounds) on
hardware where HKEY.SQTY returns 37 and HKEY.SINF()'s package has 38
elements: num_sifr becomes 38 after the += 1 workaround, the loop
correctly fills indices 0..37, and the sentinel write then targets
index 38, one past the end -- a silent 4-byte heap overflow on kernels
without CONFIG_UBSAN.
Tightening the rejection check to num_sifr <= package.count would
avoid the overflow but breaks probe() entirely on exactly this
hardware, since num_sifr == package.count is the case the off-by-one
workaround exists to support. Nothing else in the driver reads this
sentinel value back, so simply skip the write when there is no room
for it instead.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
No fix is confirmed yet. Restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation within your standard update timelines, and watch the vendor's advisory for the fix.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it