EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationSerious severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet.
- •High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.6%CVSS: 7.5Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.
Net::IDN::UTS46 versions before 2.590 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic punycode encoding of an overlong label before the length check in to_ascii.
to_ascii punycode encodes each label and only then applies the 63-byte DNS limit. encode_punycode in both backends follows the sample implementation in RFC 3492, whose outer loop runs once per distinct non-ASCII code point and scans the whole input each round, so a label of distinct non-ASCII characters costs the square of its length before the limit rejects it. Every ASCII conversion in the distribution, including domain_to_ascii and email_to_ascii, goes through to_ascii.
CISA SSVCTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
No fix is confirmed yet. Restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high, and watch the vendor's advisory for the fix.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it: high means the affected system is essential to your organisation's mission, or its compromise could cause irreversible harm to people. CISA's decision table