EchelonGraph verdictMonitorNo release containing the referenced fix is confirmed: check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: —CVSS: 4.8Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
A fix is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but no release containing it is confirmed — find the release that contains it; until it is applied, mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation).
The MCTP over USB device class in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_usb.c splits RX handling across two threads: the system workqueue runs mctp_usb_class_out_work(), which parses host OUT data byte by byte and fills a packet buffer at usb->rx_pkt, while the USB device stack thread runs mctp_usb_class_disable(). The disable handler used k_work_cancel(), which removes a queued work item but returns immediately without waiting for a handler that is already running, and then called mctp_usb_reset_rx_state() to mctp_pktbuf_free() the packet buffer the worker may still be using.
Both entry points into mctp_usb_class_disable() are driven by the attached USB host: a SET_CONFIGURATION request and a USB bus reset both reach it via usbd_config_reset() in subsys/usb/device_next/usbd_config.c. A host that streams partial MCTP frames on the bulk OUT endpoint and repeatedly forces a configuration change or bus reset therefore controls both the data being parsed and the moment the teardown runs, and can retry the race indefinitely without credentials or user interaction.
If the free lands while the worker holds the pointer, the worker writes host-supplied bytes into freed memory of the dedicated MCTP heap (CONFIG_MCTP_HEAP_SIZE in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_memory.c), corrupting recycled buffers or sys_heap free-block metadata; this window requires genuine parallelism, i.e. CONFIG_SMP or a preemptible CONFIG_SYSTEM_WORKQUEUE_PRIORITY. With the default cooperative workqueue the worker can still yield inside mctp_bus_rx() (application callback or a control-message reply blocking in mctp_usb_tx()), after which it resumes and calls mctp_pktbuf_free(usb->rx_pkt) on a pointer the teardown has NULLed, dereferencing NULL and faulting on targets with null-pointer detection.
The fix replaces the cancel with k_work_cancel_sync() plus a new struct k_work_sync out_work_sync, so disable waits for the RX worker to finish before draining the FIFO and freeing the packet buffer. The affected code is the MCTP subsystem, which is marked experimental, built only with CONFIG_MCTP_USB.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (4.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 4.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 4.8 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- Unknown (no EPSS on record)Unknown, not low: FIRST has published no EPSS probability for this CVE.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it