In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer
fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as
int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count),
is a size_t. The expression
trkcount * rpt_max * sizeof(struct eckd_count)
is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is
silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit
fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range
(start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation
yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually
requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation,
while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the
untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer.
Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a
size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL
instead of a silently truncated allocation size.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-29). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it