In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/filemap: __filemap_add_folio() restore index before retrying
In __filemap_add_folio()'s split-a-conflict loop, xas_set_order() is
applied repeatedly: each application modifies xas.xa_index, rounding it
down according to the split_order attempted at that stage: and if all goes
as intended, it eventually (or immediately) converges on an
xas_try_split() to the required folio_order, with xas.xa_index now the
same as index: then xas_store() puts the new folio into the xarray there.
But if a new node was needed, and GFP_NOWAIT allocation did not get one,
the lock is dropped, xas_nomem() used to allocate, and sequence retried.
If (that part of) the xarray is unchanged when the lock is reacquired, no
problem. But what if the conflict was meanwhile resolved by another
thread (perhaps even doing the same thing, inserting a folio at that same
index)? Isn't there a danger of now putting our folio into the xarray at
an intermediate rounded-down index? With !folio_contains() bug to follow,
when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is checking for that.
Fix this with an xas_set_order() to restore the original xas.xa_index at
the bottom of the loop, so the retry does a full re-evaluation after
reacquiring the lock, and cannot reach xas_store() with the wrong index.
Production was suffering from rare SIGILLs and SIGSEGVs, executable text
found a page away from where it belonged, !folio_contains() bug hit when
debug enabled: symptoms not seen since this patch went in.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-30). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it