EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.4%CVSS: 8.1Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.
The CVE record's CNA (Apache Software Foundation) lists Apache Software Foundation Apache Parquet Hadoop versions 1.12 up to and including 1.18.0 as affected. No release containing a fix is confirmed on record.
Potential problem for users of the org.apache.parquet.crypto.keytools package in Apache Parquet, versions 1.12 to 1.18.
This package enables users to encrypt Parquet files via an envelope encryption mechanism that wraps (encrypts) data keys via a Key Management Service (KMS).
On the reader side, the KMS URL can be application-controlled or file-controlled.
If the user does not leverage application control for this parameter, a file-controlled KMS URL is forwarded to a pluggable KmsClient implementation.
If the pluggable implementation does not perform host validation, a KMS token can be sent to a malicious host set by an attacker in the file.
Before the problem is fixed, users are recommended to leverage application control for KMS URL parameter in readers (versions 1.12-1.18).
After the problem is fixed (presumably in version 1.19), the upgrade will disable file-controlled KMS URL by default. Users of the KMS URL parameter
will have two options then: leverage application control for KMS URL parameter in readers, or enable file-controlled KMS URL (via a new app parameter).
The latter option will explicitly require (in the new parameter documentation) to validate the KMS URL and use authentication in the custom implementation of the KMS client plug in.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
No fix is confirmed yet. Restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation within your standard update timelines, and watch the vendor's advisory for the fix.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it