In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow
iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes changed ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data within EOF. This trims io_size when a writeback range extends past end_pos:
ioend->io_size += map_len; if (ioend->io_offset + ioend->io_size > end_pos) ioend->io_size = end_pos - ioend->io_offset;
However, if end_pos ends up below ioend->io_offset, the subtraction becomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned wrap to a huge value. This can happen when writeback continues past byte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent truncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in iomap_writeback_handle_eof().
A wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt completion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume io_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW completion ranges.
Fix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before the ioend start offset. This preserves the original intent of trimming io_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow.